Peace and Conflict Studies
Volume 17
Number 1 Peacebuilding, Reconciliation, and
Transformation: Voices from the Canada–EU
Conflict Resolution Student Exchange
Consortium

Article 5

5-2010

Rethinking Reconciliation: The Lessons from the Balkans and
South Africa
Mitja Žagar
University of Ljubljana, mitja.zagar@guest.arnes.si

Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs
Part of the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Žagar, Mitja (2010) "Rethinking Reconciliation: The Lessons from the Balkans and South Africa," Peace
and Conflict Studies: Vol. 17 : No. 1 , Article 5.
DOI: 10.46743/1082-7307/2010.1114
Available at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol17/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Peace & Conflict Studies at NSUWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Peace and Conflict Studies by
an authorized editor of NSUWorks. For more information,
please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.

Rethinking Reconciliation: The Lessons from the Balkans and South Africa
Abstract
Reconciliation, described as coming to terms with the past, is considered an important component of
normalization and development in post-conflict societies. The international community and some political
elites promote it as a desired approach to (re)establishing trust and cooperation, ideally leading to clean
slate situation, which might be possible only if all sides are fully committed to the process and
unconditionally accept its outcomes. Reality, however, is often different. Exploring concepts, practices
and experiences in the Balkans and South Africa the contribution studies successes, problems and
failures of reconciliation. It attempts to rethink and re-conceptualize reconciliation and develop alternative
approaches.
Keywords
Keywords: Balkans, diversity management, post-conflict societies, reconciliation, South Africa, trust and
cooperation

Author Bio(s)
Mitja Žagar is Research Councilor at the Institute for Ethnic Studies and Full Professor at the Universities
of Ljubljana and Primorska/Litoral. He is a jurist and political scientist, who specializes in: Comparative
Constitutional Law, Comparative Politics and Government, International Law, Human Rights, International
Relations, Ethnic Studies, Diversity Management, Peace and Conflict Studies. His research, writing and
lecturing (in Slovenia and worldwide) have focused on international law and minority protection,
comparative constitutional law and comparative politics and government, transition, democratic reforms,
federalism, ethnic relations and diversity management— particularly in Eastern and South Eastern Europe
(the Balkans), but also in other regions and globally. Email: mitja.zagar@guest.arnes.si

This article is available in Peace and Conflict Studies: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol17/iss1/5

Rethinking Reconciliation
Rethinking Reconciliation:
The Lessons from the Balkans and South Africa
Mitja Žagar

Abstract

Reconciliation, described as coming to terms with the past, is considered an
important component of normalization and development in post-conflict societies.
The international community and some political elites promote it as a desired
approach to (re)establishing trust and cooperation, ideally leading to clean slate
situation, which might be possible only if all sides are fully committed to the process
and unconditionally accept its outcomes. Reality, however, is often different.
Exploring concepts, practices and experiences in the Balkans and South Africa the
contribution studies successes, problems and failures of reconciliation. It attempts to
rethink and re-conceptualize reconciliation and develop alternative approaches.

Introduction

Often reconciliation is viewed as an important (if not necessary) component of
successful processes of normalization and reconstruction in post-conflict societies,
particularly as a tool that might help in healing painful psychological wounds by
promoting justice, responsibility and re-establishing trust and cooperation in posttraumatic situations. Particularly since World War II and its tragic experiences, the
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international community, some political elites and several nongovernmental
organizations have also shared this view and have promoted and favored reconciliation as
a preferred approach to the management and resolution of crises and conflicts. It is also
viewed as an adequate foundation for the future development of diverse and asymmetric
post-conflict societies, particularly those that were characterized as divided societies.
Consequently, in different parts of the world and in diverse situations reconciliation was
initiated, introduced and carried out or—at least—attempted with various degrees of
success.
These cases offer opportunities to study specific situations and backgrounds,
expectations, concepts, approaches and practices that were employed, as well as their
impacts in both shorter and longer terms. This should be considered particularly
important in cases that initially are declared successes, while in a longer term
deficiencies, shortcomings and problems of the processes might become evident.
Consequently, one needs be aware of the time dimension in any assessment of
reconciliation as well as the historic dynamics and consequences that it might generate in
time. My research into reconciliation and diversity management in post-conflict
situations followed such an approach and focused on the testing of the working
hypothesis that reconciliation can be a useful approach to normalization, reconstruction
and development in post-conflict societies, which can be successful only if all relevant
actors in a certain environment agree with it, truly accept it with all consequences and
fully commit to the process and its success. However, in my view reconciliation cannot
replace legal justice and the role of police and judiciary in the prosecution of perpetrators
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of crimes and atrocities, but can only complement them taking into account the cultural
specificities of a certain environment.
Considering the limitations mentioned above the traditional concepts, nature and
contents of reconciliation need to be reexamined and rethought, as well as (new)
alternative concepts and approaches developed. My research, particularly in the Western
Balkans but also in other post-conflict societies, shows that it is especially important to
(re)establish communication, (re)build (at least) basic economic and social infrastructure
and trust, as well as develop and constantly reconfirm common interests as the basis for
the future common existence, cooperation and development of all distinct communities in
those environments. Consequently my second working hypothesis is that if reconciliation
can contribute to these goals it should be embraced and introduced. However, if
reconciliation does not contribute to these short and medium term goals and particularly
if it proves to harm their realization, it is not productive to insist on it or introduce it. In
other words, I would consider reconciliation an approach and a possible tool for the
realization of goals specified above that contribute to normalization and strengthening
stability in post-conflict situations.
This article explores the diverse concepts, backgrounds and practices of
reconciliation in the Balkans considering also cases and experiences from other parts of
the world, particularly from South Africa. It combines qualitative and quantitative
approaches and methods and draws on official documents, media reports, other materials,
and scholarly works on reconciliation. To a large extent my research and interpretation of
its results are based on a considerable number of (in-depth) interviews (in the past two
decades more than two hundred interviews in all countries of the Balkans, more than
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twenty with interviewees from South Africa and a considerable number from other
countries including Argentina, Australia, Canada, East Timor, USA etc.). It also draws on
several hundred conversations world-wide with scholars, politicians, public officials,
civic society activists and public opinion leaders, particularly those who were in different
capacities involved in reconciliation, as well as with a few individuals who directly
participated in the processes of reconciliation in different environments. These interviews
and conversations provide very interesting insights into reconciliation in specific
environments. They illustrate the diverse views and evaluations of those processes and
their outcomes and impacts in respective societies. These complement and often
contradict traditional views, approaches and evaluations, including those presented by the
scholarly literature.
To provide the point of reference and establish the basis and framework for the
analysis of reconciliation in specific environments this article continues with the
elaboration of (simple) working definitions of reconstruction, normalization and
reconciliation (as social phenomena and processes). The following section discusses
specific situations and conditions in the Western Balkans considering the existence of
necessary preconditions for reconciliation, particularly the readiness and commitment of
relevant actors, as well as existing questions regarding the possible nature and contents,
procedures, institutions and actors, results and consequences of reconciliation.
Comparison with other environments and cases of reconciliation, particularly with South
Africa is used to analyze why initiatives and attempts to start and successfully complete
reconciliation processes in the Balkans failed and continue to fail. Testing the hypotheses
the article also explores possible modifications and evolutions of the current concepts of
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reconciliation as well as alternatives to reconciliation that would contribute to the
successful normalization, reconstruction and diversity management in post-conflict
societies.

Normalization, Reconstruction, and
Reconciliation in Post-Conflict Societies:
Concepts, Definitions and Their Characteristics

The very title of this section includes a few complex concepts (describing even
more complex social phenomena) that need to be explained and defined to avoid possible
misunderstandings and to provide an adequate point of reference and theoretical
framework for my further analysis. What follows are simple working definitions of those
concepts that I presented also to my interviewees and partners in conversations after I had
asked them for their own descriptions and/or definitions of those phenomena. This way
they were better able to understand and answer my questions as well as to explain their
perceptions and views regarding respective concepts and phenomena. Simultaneously,
these working definitions, based on the available scholarly literature as well as my
previous and current research findings were (and still are) instrumental in making my
research more focused and operational. These working definitions evolved throughout
my study and still continue to evolve in the light of new information and findings. The
same is true also for the methodology.
The first concept that requires definition and additional explanation is the concept
of post-conflict societies, used in this text to describe those societies in which conflicts of
high intensity, and particularly violent conflicts, have just been terminated or (at least)
deescalated and frozen. Although it is problematic to speak of post-conflict situations
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and/or societies, since conflicts can always (re)appear in every diverse/plural
environment, this term is often used by international organizations (for example, UN,
World Bank, OSCE etc.), diverse projects (for example, United Nations University –
World Institute for Development Economics Research and their Global Governance and
Conflict project, Social Science Research Network – SSRN) and in scholarly literature.
(See, for example: Brinkerhoff, ed., 2007; Fairbanks and Brennan, 2005; Lambach, 2007;
Making Peace Work, 2004) From the analysis of conflicts and diversity management, and
considering the probability of diverse conflicts in all plural environments as well as the
life-cycles of specific conflicts and the likelihood of their escalation, I would suggest
that every internally diverse society can be observed and determined simultaneously as a
pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict society. However, traumatic experiences of violent
conflicts, particularly wars, large scale violence, atrocities (against civilian population)
and war crimes dramatically interrupts the normal life of people and tend to influence and
transform societies that have experienced them. Consequently, rather than using a general
concept of “post-conflict societies” in such cases it might be more appropriate and
precise to speak of “post-violent-conflict societies” at a certain historic time immediately
following the cessation and/or end of respective violent conflicts. Such an approach
would indicate that in every society several diverse (low intensity, protracted, emerging)
conflicts still exist and – if they are not managed and/or resolved adequately – may
escalate and even transform into high intensity violent conflicts. In other words, we could
say that “post-(violent)-conflict societies”—if they do not manage diversities, crises and
conflicts properly—could be just a transitory pre-conflict stage before the new escalation
of conflicts in a certain plural/diverse environment.
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The concept of a post-conflict (particularly post-violent-conflict) situation and/or
society can be a useful analytical tool for the analysis and classification of conflicts in
diverse environments. In the context of conflict management and resolution it can be used
in determining, analyzing and explaining the phases in life-cycles (processes) of
particular conflicts in diverse environments that are instrumental for the elaboration and
development of effective long(er)-term strategies for diversity management at all levels.
These diversity management strategies should provide for stability and peace in those
environments by setting the frameworks for the engagement and coordination of all
relevant actors (states and their institutions, international organization, civic society and
its actors as well as individuals) that can contribute to the prevention of possible
(uncontrolled) escalations and intensification of conflicts and their transformation into
violent conflicts as well as to the successful and possibly democratic management and
resolution of crises and conflicts. (Žagar, 2009, pp. 463–472)
Normalization can be described simply as a process of restoring and developing
(the feeling and perception of) normalcy in environments affected by intense, escalated
and particularly violent conflicts that in different ways can impact upon every dimension
of (human) beings and relations and the very fabric of societies. This process
encompasses all activities, programs, policies and strategies that can reduce the possible
negative consequences of escalated conflicts, and can contribute to stability, peace and
development in their respective environments. In this context reconstruction and
reconciliation can be important components of normalization.
As a component of the process of normalization the process and concept of
reconstruction can be defined simply as the rebuilding, reparation and reconstruction of
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damage in all spheres of life and societies caused by violent and particularly military
conflicts. Usually, reconstruction in a particular environment is framed and materialized
in several concrete policies, programs and projects. Although the focus is usually initially
on immediate humanitarian aid and later on economic and material reconstruction and
rebuilding to establish the necessary economic and social infrastructure (such as
transportation, energy, housing, public services – including health and education), I insist
that the process of reconstruction should encompass all spheres of life and societies that
are damaged by intense conflicts. (See, for example: Anderlinia and El-Bushra,
2004/2007). My research shows that, frequently, nonmaterial damage(s) caused by
conflicts might be more difficult and time consuming to repair and/or compensate than
any material damage. Often it proves impossible to rebuild and reconstruct relations and
social structures destroyed and/or damaged by intense and violent conflicts in particular
environments, which then requires building and development of new ones that, hopefully,
can replace (or ideally even improve) those that were destroyed. The necessary
preconditions for such processes of (re)construction, (re)building and development
include functional and open communication (with information-sharing that improves
adequate knowledge about other distinct communities), mutual trust and the cooperation
of all relevant actors.
In this context, transitional and post-conflict justice should be mentioned as an
important factor in restoring and preserving peace and stability, as well as of trust and
cooperation building in post-conflict societies. Transitional and post-conflict justice can
encompass various efforts, forms and activities such as the prosecution of perpetrators of
war and other crimes and atrocities, purges, banishment and expulsion, as well as non  Ȉͳǡͳ
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retributive justice, such as restitution, reparations to victims, rehabilitation, and diverse
forms of reconciliation, particularly truth commissions. Ideally these actions should be
based on the principle of the rule of law in democratic settings or in societies that are
committed to democratic development and democratization, and all forms of post-conflict
justice should be based on laws passed by competent democratic representative
institutions (parliaments, legislative bodies). These should precisely define and regulate
material law, procedures and institutional frameworks including the powers, rights and
duties of the competent institutions. Although amnesty and exile can contribute to deescalation of conflicts’ intensity and can help in establishing peace in certain
environments and historic circumstances, abstaining from post-conflict justice might have
destabilizing effects in a longer term. (See, for example: de Brito, Gonzalez-Enriquez and
Aguilar (eds.), 2001; Elster, 2004; Galtung, 2001; Lie, Binningsbø and Gates, 2007;
McAdams, 1997)
From this perspective reconciliation could be described simply as a specific form
of non-retributive post-conflict justice that might be a useful tool in the process of
normalization. However, concepts and practices of reconciliation are far more complex
and, in many ways, problematic in their efforts to reach a broad agreement (particularly
of those sides opposing each other in the conflict) regarding the (historic) “truth”.
Consequently, in search of a compromise acceptable to all involved parties, processes and
efforts of reconciliation should attempt to consider, recognize and reconcile diverse views
and perceptions of history, the role of history, history teaching and various interpretations
of history. (Marko-Stöckl, 2008, pp. 3–4)
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The concept of reconciliation as a possible component of the process of
normalization and “social reconstruction” in post-conflict societies can be described as “a
process that reaffirms and develops a society and its institutions based on shared values
and human rights” thereby enabling former belligerent groups and individuals to find and
develop new ways of living together peacefully, based on mutual respect, tolerance,
cooperation and inclusiveness. (Weinstein, and Stover, 2004, p. 5) In other words,
peaceful coexistence and restoration of normalcy in a diverse society that was torn apart
by a conflict requires the ‘building of (working and cooperative) relationship’ that
corresponds to Lederach’s minimal definition of reconciliation as a process that includes
critical components such as truth, justice, mercy, and peace. (Lederach, 2004, p. 151) To
stress the temporal dimension and complexity of the process of reconciliation, it can be
said that:

Reconciliation is not an event but a process. It is not a linear process. It is a
difficult, long and unpredictable one, involving various steps and stages… the first
stage is replacing fear with non-violent co-existence; the second step is building
confidence and trust, and the third step is achieving empathy. (Ilievski, 2008, 6)

Galtung summarizes reconciliation after violence in a simple equation: “Reconciliation =
Closure + Healing; closure in the sense of not reopening hostilities, healing in the sense
of being rehabilitated” (2001, p. 4) In his view the best results can be achieved when all
parties in a certain environment, especially those that were involved in a conflict, agree to
cooperate in resolution and reconstruction.
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My research findings confirm such a view. The full agreement of all relevant
actors that participate in the process as its parties, particularly their full acceptance and
commitment to reconciliation, are the necessary—although not always sufficient—
(pre)conditions for its success. In other words, based on the views of my interviewees,
every successful attempt of reconciliation requires that before the formal and actual start
of the process all participating parties should agree, at the very least on:
x

The reasons for reconciliation, as well as the principles and declared main goals
of reconciliation,

x

The parties that should participate in the process,

x

The content(s), particularly on precisely defined historic period(s) and (traumatic)
events that are to be addressed by the process of reconciliation,

x

The institutional framework, structure and organization, most frequently in the
form of Truth Commissions (or, possibly, public hearings/meetings) that might be
given administrative and expert support by diverse state and public institutions,
for example by public administration, judiciary and police (particularly in the
phase of investigation), as well as by civic society and its actors (such as NGOs,
churches, as well as others, including economic enterprises),

x

The exact competences, rights and duties of the institutional structure and its
institutions,

x

The procedural and material rules of reconciliation, particularly the rules of
procedure and conduct of participating parties, procedures and criteria for the
establishment of individual responsibility of perpetrators, as well as the conduct
of individuals—both perpetrators and victims—including the formal and symbolic
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acts of confession of perpetrators, acceptance of individual’s guilt and
responsibility, and forgiveness expressed by victims,
x

The formal consequences of confessions and acceptance of individual guilt and
responsibility, particularly formal criminal amnesty of perpetrators,

x

The time-frame (duration of reconciliation), particularly the deadline when the
process of reconciliation and all activities within it should be completed,

x

The process of reporting and evaluation in particular phases and at the end of the
process of reconciliation.
The likelihood that such agreements would provide an adequate basis for

reconciliation depends on the specific situation, the relations between the parties and the
balance of power in the post-conflict environment. It is believed that this likelihood
increases in environments committed to (re)building democracy, tolerance, peaceful
coexistence and cooperation. Reconciliation might be more likely in post-conflict
situations and societies where a clear-cut division between parties exists and where
victorious sides request and promote such a process. On the other hand, reconciliation is
less likely in environments and post-conflict situations where it is impossible to identify
victors and losers clearly, where there are diverse and opposing interpretations of history
and traumatic experiences, where there are several opposing interests, and where one or
some sides oppose reconciliation or demand concessions (such as exculpation or
amnesty) that are unacceptable to other parties. Reconciliation might be even less likely
or, at least, more complex and uncertain in ethnically plural post-conflict societies, where
ethnicity becomes a dividing line and the process is perceived as interethnic
reconciliation, particularly in cases when certain parties reject it. Namely, reconciliation
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is impossible without the consent and participation of all parties that need to agree “to
face recent past objectively” (Petriuši, Kmezi, and Žagar, 2008, 5).
Taking into account possible social impacts, my research developed a working
definition of reconciliation that saw it as a tool for diversity, crisis and conflict
management that could contribute to normalization and stability in internally diverse
societies, particularly those considered divided-societies. As such,

reconciliation is a specific process that leads to the commonly acceptable and
accepted (re)interpretation of the past, especially of specific shared traumatic past
developments. In a way it is a past-oriented and usually painful process of healing
that, however, has several present- and future-oriented goals and impacts. Ideally,
it can create the formal basis and conditions for peace, coexistence and
cooperation in the present and future and for the necessary social cohesion that
enables elaboration and realization of common interests (Žagar, 2007/8, p. 401).

In this context the importance of the temporal dimensions and limitations of
reconciliation should be stressed—both in terms of exactly defining and agreeing upon
the historic periods it addresses, as well as in determining the exact duration of the formal
processes of reconciliation and their deadlines. Traditionally, all temporal dimensions of
reconciliation should be exactly defined and, normally, limited to a certain, relatively
short period. Reconciliation should follow conceptual, procedural, material and
institutional frameworks and foundations as well as time-frames determined by the
legislation and political decisions that should be agreed upon and accepted by all relevant
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actors. Often we can detect fears that processes of reconciliation can result in possible
threats to stability if they are not limited to a relatively short time. There are also fears
that reconciliation “can become a never-ending, permanent process that constantly
reinforces certain historic traumas.” (Žagar, 2007/8 (©2010), p. 401) However,
successful diversity management in plural and particularly divided societies demands the
development and utilization of effective approaches, mechanisms and procedures that can
address, prevent, manage and resolve problems and tensions in intercommunal and
interethnic relations. If this can be done in peaceful and democratic ways, it might
prevent escalations of crises and conflicts, and particularly their traumatic consequences.
In this context revised and transformed concepts of permanent reconciliation, as well as
other adequate alternative solutions that can successfully address and manage interethnic
and other intercommunal relations and problems, would be particularly welcome. (See
also: Redekop, 2002)
The consensus reached by the parties that participate in reconciliation regarding
the process of reconciliation—its nature, principles and contents, formal, procedural and
institutional framework, procedural and material rules, as well as its goals and
outcomes—can serve as the basis for future coexistence and cooperation in internally
diverse post-conflict societies. In the process of reconciliation perpetrators should: come
forward and confess their wrongdoings (usually violence, crimes and/or atrocities);
express and accept their guilt, responsibility and remorse; and ask their victims for
forgiveness, which, ideally, the victims are expected to accept at least formally. Such
reconciliation can be viewed as a process of purification and consensus building that
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could contribute to the reduction of social tensions and historic traumas in post-conflict
societies.

Potentials, Expectations, Successes, and
Problems of Reconciliation:
Experiences from the Balkans and South Africa

My research in reconciliation started in the second half of the 1980s when I
entered the field of peace and conflict studies and focused my research on the theory and
practice of crises and conflicts, the determination of their life-cycles, and the responses of
particular environments to crises and conflicts, particularly into their prevention,
management and/or resolution. In this context I examined reconciliation as a possible tool
of conflict analysis, prevention, management and resolution, as well as diversity
management in plural societies that can be used effectively especially in the phase(s) of
de-escalation of high-intensity and particularly violent conflicts. (Žagar, 2007) Soon I
discovered that regardless of certain communalities and similarities each crisis and
conflict was a specific and unique case that should be analyzed, treated and managed as
such. Although these specific cases can be studied comparatively in order to determine
specific differences and communalities among them, one should be very careful in
interpreting and generalizing the findings. Detected differences and specificities often
prove more important and decisive than similarities and communalities. Additionally, in
every environment that I studied I detected a substantial gap between the normative
framework on the one hand and the actual situation and practice on the other hand which
further complicates comparison and makes any generalization rather inadequate or even
impossible. Considering all the problems and weaknesses as well as limitations of the
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research findings, however, comparative research still proves to be the most applicable
and useful approach.
These considerations and limitations apply also to my case studies and
comparative studies of reconciliation in different environments in the Balkans
(particularly in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia)
and in South Africa, as well as to my presentations, interpretations and generalization of
research results in this article. Consequently, this text should not be treated as a detailed
analysis and presentation of reconciliation in respective states, but rather an attempt to
present a common framework, adequate tools and yardsticks for analysis in these
environments.
If there was the will, consensus and commitment to start, and successfully bring
to completion, the process of reconciliation in South Africa immediately after the
abolition of apartheid, they have not existed and still do not exist in the Balkans. Of
course, there are still discussions about reconciliation in different circles and
environments, as well as many initiatives—particularly external (including those of the
international community)—to try to start it. This is the reason that

[r]econciliation often appears in political declarations and diverse documents
from the region and related to the Western Balkans. Usually, these documents
speak of reconciliation in the context of human rights, protection of minorities,
refugee return, reconstruction, post-conflict development, democratization and
consolidation of democracy, peace and stability, etc., and state that reconciliation
could contribute to these goals. However, not only do they fail to define
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reconciliation’s principles and goals, but they also fail to define the process and
procedure of reconciliation (Žagar, 2007/8, p. 402).

Consequently, my initial consideration is that there is no consensus regarding
reconciliation in the region. Although it is often being discussed as the desired and even
necessary precondition for “normalization” and long-term peace and stability, nobody has
defined precisely what reconciliation in the Balkans and in every individual state in the
region should be and in which way it should be implemented. Aside from general
political statements of international and national leaders there are no substantive and/or
institutional conditions in place that are necessary for a successful process of
reconciliation. There is no consensus about the historic developments, events, issues,
actors and periods that should be addressed by such a process. As indicated, we could
question the very existence of the basic preconditions for reconciliation—the willingness,
agreement and readiness of all relevant factors to engage in the process. For, “there is
neither adequate legislation nor informal agreements on procedure, institutions and
criteria for the evaluation and reconciliation. Additionally, general and specific goals and
expected outcomes (consequences) of reconciliation are not adequately determined”
(Žagar, 2007/8, p. 404).
High hopes that the international community and a part of civic society in the
Balkan countries and outside the region will invest in initializing reconciliation at least in
individual countries do not seem to be very realistic. It seems that they ignore past
experiences from different environments and historic circumstances in all parts of the
world that inform us that reconciliation failed to produce expected results if the internal
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will and consensus regarding it and commitment to it did not exist or were weak. This is
particularly true when reconciliation was initiated, imported or even imposed from
outside.
Not surprisingly, such criticisms appeared in many interviews in which
interviewees expressed their views that successful retributive post-conflict justice,
particularly effective criminal justice—expressed in effective, strict and consistent
prosecution and conviction of all perpetrators of war and other crimes, regardless of their
background and position—would be the preferred and necessary precondition for
(re)establishing peace and stability, tolerance, trust, coexistence and cooperation in
individual countries as well as in the region. They also expressed fears that reconciliation
might cement and legitimize (in their view illegitimate) gains and spoils of war(s), but
particularly the existing situation of a balance of power based on ethnic divisions.
Although it is believed that successful reconciliation contributes to community relations,
peace and stability in an environment that was torn by a conflict, it might produce exactly
opposite results. Paradoxically, reconciliation that is perceived as a tool for ensuring
peace and stability (as its preconditions) requires an already stable situation and a mutual
acceptance by all sides involved in the process of communication, tolerance and
coexistence. Portrayed as a two way process, reconciliation inherently presupposes
certain missionary elements deriving from Christian theologies and requires forgiveness
(on behalf of victims). Consequently, sometimes reconciliation might be perceived as an
institutional design that rewards the bad guys (perpetrators of wrongdoings) and does not
ensure adequate justice for victims. These characteristics, along with the ideological
nature of reconciliation, might be particularly problematic in multiethnic, multicultural
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and multi-religious environments. Here diverse cultures, ideologies and religions might
have different views of justice and forgiveness, but particularly of confession and
absolution. Furthermore, failed reconciliation might become an important additional
generator of conflicts.
The current concepts and practices of reconciliation can be problematic and even
counterproductive if they are attempted in environments where it is unclear which sides
were victorious and which were losers, where several diverse and even opposing
interpretations of history and past traumatic experiences exist, and where all sides
committed certain wrongdoings in the time of intense and violent conflicts, particularly if
there is a dispute which of the sides involved were the victims and which perpetrators of
certain wrongdoings. In such cases it is often almost impossible to reach a consensus or
even compromise regarding the past and commonly acceptable interpretations of this
past. The task is even more difficult if reconciliation is attempted simultaneously with the
process of (democratic) transition in a post-conflict society, faced also with the dilemmas
of transitional justice and a still unstable democratic set up of the society. Additionally, in
such situations there might be several kinds and dimensions of justice and truth, often
several truths—such as judicial, political and moral justice and truth. (See, Žagar, 2007/8,
p. 402)
In the circumstances that existed in the Balkan countries it proved impossible to
reach consensus regarding the procedural and institutional framework of reconciliation.
Consequently, no adequate formal framework and no organizational structure were
determined and established in these countries. Usually, in such situations “Truth
Commissions”, which have the mission to establish the truth and responsibility of
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perpetrators, are formed and function as key reconciliation institutions. Their
compositions, modes of operation, roles, powers and competences can differ in different
environments and should be adjusted to specific circumstances and needs in these
environments. Regardless of the existence of a collective blame associated with a certain
party or collective entity that is seen as the main perpetrator of wrong-doings and/or
atrocities in a certain environment, reconciliation requires the establishment of individual
(or at least individualized) personal responsibility and accountability. Consequently,
reconciliation can be viewed as the undoing of past wrong-doings through the
perpetrator’s recognition of responsibility and accountability and remorse on the one side,
and through victims’ forgiveness on the other side. Among the main preconditions for a
possible success of the process we could list (at least) a certain level of normalization and
the beginning of reconstruction, the return of refugees and displaced persons and the
introduction of adequate measures for the protection of minorities.
In comparison with other environments where reconciliation has been attempted
and carried out with various levels of success, particularly South Africa that is often
considered a model case, I would conclude that reconciliation failed and does not exist in
the Balkans. Moreover, reconciliation has not even been started—regardless of the
diverse initiatives and aspirations, including those of the international community. My
research findings show no enthusiasm from relevant actors who are expected to
participate as parties (with diverse roles) in the process of reconciliation. Often they
doubt that reconciliation could bring any positive results in their respective environments
and sometimes express their fears of possible negative outcomes and consequences for
their distinct communities and/or themselves personally. Particularly they fear that
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reconciliation, because of its likely failure, would not contribute to peace, stability and
normalization in respective societies, but rather to instability and the escalation of
conflicts. In any case, as also many interviewees pointed out, their fears and opposition to
reconciliation seem to be stronger than possible incentives to start it and/or expectations
of its potential benefits.
Although each of the countries in the Balkans is a very specific and unique case,
certain common observations, characteristics and similarities can be summarized in the
following main conclusions:
x

Political will and the readiness to start the process of reconciliation in most
countries of the region do not exist or are very limited. Consequently, rare
statements of politicians calling for reconciliation should be considered lipservice to please the international community and potential donors (who continue
to promote the idea), rather than the actual desire to start the reconciliation.

x

Consequently, there are no serious attempts to determine and agree upon the
content(s), procedures and institutions, as well as the normative and institutional
framework, which would be necessary to start the process.

x

Frequently there is a dispute regarding the actors that should be involved in the
process of reconciliation and their roles (conditioned by diverse perceptions and
evaluations of historic events and their consequences, as well as by the lack of
recognition of responsibility of diverse actors for their actions and their
outcomes).
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x

There is also disagreement regarding the necessity and role of post-conflict
justice, particularly criminal justice and the necessity of possible abolition for
those perpetrators who participate in reconciliation.

x

There is no consensus regarding the desired outcomes and long-term goals of
reconciliation, which would provide the basis for peace, stability, normalization,
and the future cooperation of all actors. (See, Žagar, 2007/8, 404-405)
In comparison with the Balkans, and regardless of certain problems with the

process of reconciliation, South Africa has been and (largely) still is considered to be a
success. (See, for example, Adam and Moodley, 1993; Adam, Moodley, and Slabbert,
1999; Gibson, 2002; Gibson, 2004; Gibson and Gouws, 1999; Gibson and Gouws, 2003)
In South Africa the volume of the work, the involvement of people and the results of the
process presented and summarized in the reports of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission are impressive. (See, THE TRC REPORT, 1998/2009) Although
reconciliation did not fulfill all expectations, it is (still) believed that the process of
reconciliation and its results contributed substantially to: reducing (in some cases rather
intense) tensions and divisions; coming to terms with a traumatic past; building peace and
stability; and the integration of all segments into post-Apartheid South African society.
This is also the official position.
However, my interviews and several conversations in South Africa, including
those with people in streets, showed that by 2010 much of the initial enthusiasm and
optimism regarding reconciliation and the successful democratic transformation have
disappeared to a large extent. There are more and more cracks in a once optimistic
picture. No doubt, the elimination of Apartheid, reconciliation and process of democratic
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transition changed, transformed, integrated and improved South Africa in the 1990s. Yet
they did not eliminate deep divisions, social and economic injustice and inequality,
exclusion and marginalization (particularly of poor, predominantly black populations in
diverse environments) or racism (that exists in the forms of traditional, internal and
reverse racism). These problems continue, sometimes with greater intensity. On the one
hand many victims believe that the perpetrators of wrongdoings were not punished
adequately, while the victims were not compensated adequately (both in material and
nonmaterial sense). On the other hand, perpetrators seem to be less disappointed with the
process, although a few considered it an unnecessary and nonproductive humiliation that
did not produce the desired results.
It should be mentioned that the reconciliation process only addressed
wrongdoings and injustices that were brought to its attention in the determined time
period and, consequently, did not discuss all wrongdoings, crimes and injustices during
this time. Additionally, diverse problems, wrongdoings, crimes and injustices have
continued and the competent institutions of South Africa do not always address them
properly and adequately. Obviously, it was impossible to continue reconciliation
indefinitely or transform it into a permanent process that would deal with all relevant
problems and injustices as they appear. Consequently, adequate alternative formal
concepts, approaches and institutions/mechanisms that could complement and assist
democratic institutions of the country in dealing properly with these problems should
have been developed—which South Africa failed to do. Among the main problems that
might need to be addressed Terry Bell listed: adequate social and economic development
that should take into account the environment (including climate problems) and social
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justice; growing economic and social injustice and exclusion; gender and class issues;
adequate integration; and a lack of social infrastructure and services, particularly the
access of the poor to education, health and social security. He also mentioned corruption
and crime that in many ways are the negative consequences of the inability to properly
address all these problems. Luckily, he said the award of the 2010 World Cup and its
positive economic effects to a certain extent helped in neutralizing a worse economic
crisis.

Conclusion:
Reconciliation Rethought and
Alternative Solutions

The discussion of reconciliation so far confirms the hypothesis that it can be a
useful approach to and tool for normalization, reconstruction and development in postconflict societies. However, this requires the full acceptance, agreement, and commitment
of all parties. It can successfully complement state institutions in the prosecution of
perpetrators of diverse wrongdoings in a certain historic time, but cannot replace them. In
this context the temporal dimensions (the determined period that is addressed) and
limitations (the exactly determined duration of the process of reconciliation) of traditional
reconciliation reduce its applicability and efficiency as a tool of crisis and conflict
prevention, management and reconciliation, particularly as an adequate tool for
permanent diversity management in plural societies. I would argue that for such a role
reconciliation should transform into a permanent ongoing process that takes into account
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a broader social and historic context. It could become a permanent process for screening
and evaluating social relations that would detect and point to undesired and problematic
developments and actions in a certain environment. In this context, the process should
constantly re-examine and confirm the will of all parties to participate in the process, as
well as basic principles and values that are agreed upon in these environments.
Simultaneously, it has to determine directions and strategies of future development.
Traditional reconciliation seems to be an appropriate tool for dealing with
traumatic experiences and problems that should not be forgotten, but it should also
consider important lessons that could contribute to the prevention of such and/or similar
events in the future. Traditional concepts should also recognize that all historic events,
including traumatic ones, have their prehistory and broader social contexts that are
relevant for reconciliation. Additionally, such historic events might have several
consequences in diverse spheres of life and society that might last for several generations.
All this should be taken into consideration in determining the time frame.
I can confirm also the hypothesis that reconciliation should be introduced only
when it is expected to contribute to peace and stability in a certain post-conflict
environment. However, traditional concepts of reconciliation should be transformed
and/or complemented by alternative approaches that can (re)establish communication,
(re)build (at least) basic economic and social infrastructure and trust, as well as develop
and constantly reconfirm common interests as the basis for the future common existence,
cooperation and development of all distinct communities in those environments.
Consequently, reconciliation should always be considered and evaluated as a possible
tool for normalization and peace- and stability-building in post-conflict societies.
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Among alternative and/or complementary approaches and mechanisms that can
contribute to long-term peace, stability and democratic development in particular postconflict societies I have mentioned normalization and diversity management, with the
prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts as key components.
Normalization is a process of creating conditions of mutual recognition and acceptance,
tolerance, coexistence and (hopefully equal) cooperation in a certain plural and diverse
environment that should be the basis for determination and realization of common
interests. It can include also different segments of diversity management and should
stimulate the development of adequate procedures and mechanisms for the peaceful and
democratic management and resolution of crises and conflicts based on the principles of
equality and non-discrimination, and human rights—including minority rights. If
normalization is a transitional approach and concept that can be utilized in crisis
situations and post-conflict societies, diversity management represents a permanent
process that addresses issues of recognition, regulation, management and adequate
protection of all socially relevant diversities in a certain environment. It can be described
“as a set of strategies, policies, concepts and approaches, programmes, measures and
activities that should ensure equality, equal possibilities, participation and inclusion in all
spheres of social, economic and political life (both public and private life) for all
individuals and communities within a society, especially for immigrants, persons
belonging to national and other minorities, marginalized individuals, minorities and other
distinct communities.” (See, Žagar, 2006/7, 320)
My conclusion regarding reconciliation in the Balkans would be that it does not
exist, since it is not even spelled out and accepted as a realistic goal. Considering the
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rather negative attitude towards reconciliation by relevant social and political actors as
well as people in the countries of the region it might be more productive to speak,
instead, of normalization or a democratic political process that could provide a stable
basis for power-sharing and cooperation, particularly in determining and realizing the
common interests of all individuals and distinct communities in these environments.
These elements are important components of diversity management that in the long term
might prove to be the most adequate approach and mechanism for the region and its
countries.
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